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1. INTRODUCTION 
Convergence is defined as the decreasing gap of GDP growth rates between 
leading and lagging countries. This thesis is based on the Veblen’s idea of “Advantages 
of Backwardness”. It states that a less developed country tends to grow, at a rate which is 
inversely proportional to its initial GDP per capita; that is, faster than more advanced 
countries. There are several reasons for this convergence across different countries. First, 
there is a scope for poor nations to absorb existing technology and to catch up advanced 
countries if the gap between country’s technologies is larger. Second, the development 
process is often characterised by a shift of resources from low productivity agriculture 
sector to high productivity industrial sector. The process certainly benefits more the poor 
nations because the capacity for such shift is more in poor countries than in rich 
countries.1   
Empirical work in a cross section framework demonstrates little or no support for 
absolute convergence in per capita GDP. The literature, however, supports this 
hypothesis for homogenous group of countries [Dowrick and Nguyen (1989), Ben-David 
(1993, 1996)]. Alam (1992) empirically identifies factors that influence the rate of 
convergence across countries. These factors include size of the domestic market, trade 
intensity, Heitger index, initial enrollments in higher education expressed as a percentage 
of the population in a relevant age cohort, and a Harbison-Myers index of human capital. 
Abramovitz (1986, 1990) argues that the advantage of the backwardness primarily 
depends on the nation’s willingness to realise the potential rapid growth: what he calls 
Social Capability. The pace at which the potentiality is realised depends on factors that 
limit diffusion of knowledge, the rate of structural change, the accumulation of capital, 
and the expansion of demand. However, the empirical literature fails to recognise that the 
social capability is seriously undermined due to pervasive corruption. Chowdhury (2004) 
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argues that corruption is one of the reasons for non-convergence across SAARC 
countries. He did not provide any empirical support for his argument, however.  
In this paper I attempt to demonstrate that persistent corruption influences the 
social capabilities and thus impedes the rate of convergence in per capita income across 
countries. I approach this task by following the same methodology used in convergence 
literature. I hypothesise that lagging countries do not grow faster than leading countries 
simply because lagging countries are unable to break the shackle of high level of 
corruption. Thus, this divergence in corruption rankings, which I call C-divergence, 
explains the non-convergence of GDP per capita between lagging and leading economies. 
In other words, these corrupt countries will form a “corrupt club” making corruption 
more persistent. This is because an already corrupt society is likely to create an 
environment where newcomers are also treated as corrupt.  There is pressure on honest 
officials to be corrupt. Thus, the poor collective reputation of the previous corrupt 
government partly determines future corruption. There may be a demonstration effect 
across club members such that officials of one nation perceive the gains of corruption and 
mimic the behavior of their peers. Also, multi national corporations (MNCs) and foreign 
investors may help create a culture of corruption across a subset of poor nations with 
weak statutory and legal protections, thereby spreading the “disease” more widely. 
The literature on convergence often describes two seemingly similar concepts of 
convergence. First, β convergence shows the tendency of poor countries to grow faster 
than rich countries. Second, σ convergence indicates a declining dispersion in per capital 
income for a group of countries over time. An index of rank concordance (γ convergence) 
is another measure of convergence used in Boyle and McCarthy (1997). I borrow the 
above measures from the convergence literature and show that countries are C-diverging 
in corruption ranking.  
The study is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data and explains the 
methodology of this empirical investigation. Section 3 presents the empirical results and 
final section concludes the study. 
 
2.  DATA AND METHOD 
The basic theme of this paper is to show that C-divergence process in corruption 
across a diverse group of countries influences the convergence process in per capita GDP. 
The empirical analysis of corruption for a large sample of countries has been constrained 
for almost two decades by lack of data. There are two reasons for this gap. First, it is 
difficult to define corruption in a way that is valid across countries. A transaction that is 
considered corrupt in one culture may be regarded as benign in another. Second, corrupt 
transactions are kept secret because they are illegal, so counting and estimating is hard. 
The paucity of data on corruption was solved by some business firms who 
conducted questionnaire-based surveys to measure the perception of corruption. These 
surveys ask firms’ correspondents to rank countries on the basis of their perceptions. 
Almost all of these sources define corruption as the misuse of public power for private 
benefits such as the bribes to public officials or kickbacks on government contracts.  
I have used Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Indices (CPI) that 
are now available for almost ten years from 1996 to 2005 for forty economies including 
both developed and developing world. The index ranges from 0 (corrupt) to 10 (clean). 
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The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Indices are available 
electronically at http://www.transparency.org. The categorisation of countries is given in 
Table 1. 
One usually tests the unconditional or absolute convergence by running the Barro 
(1991) type regressions, which involve regressing the growth in GDP per capita on its 
initial level for a given cross-section of countries. This methodology however, produces 
biased estimate of β convergence [Friedman (1992) and Quah (1993)].  Moreover, in my 
case corruption indices are merely perceptions about corruption and are used to rank 
countries without attaching any significance to their absolute values. A country with CPI 
of 2.8 and 2.9 are both corrupt.  
I have used two seemingly different methods. First, I attempt to show that the 
average corruption over a ten-year period (1996-2005) is directly related to the initial 
value of the corruption index. A positive relationship suggests that initially corrupt 
countries are on average corrupt over the ten year time period. I also check this 
relationship by introducing a dummy variable for corrupt countries whose index is less 
than 3. I ran the following regression: 
Average CPI (1996-2005) = β0 + β1 * Initial CPI (1996) + β2 * D … (1) 
Where CPI is corruption perceptions index and D = 1 if CPI is less than 3 and D = 0 
otherwise. 
Second, I have categorised, using average CPI (1996-2005), countries into four 
groups: namely corrupt (0 to less than 3), partly corrupt (3 to less than 5), partly 
clean (5 to less than 7), and clean (7 to less than 10).  I then show that there is 
absence of marked improvement in the corruption indices of corrupt countries for the 
whole period.  
To support my results, I follow Sala-I-Martin’s (1996) methodology and estimate 
the dispersion in corruption indices and coefficient of variation of corruption indices; I 
call C-σ convergence across countries. To further strengthen my analysis and recognising 
the fact that corruption indices are primarily for ranking countries, I follow Boyle and 
McCarthy’s (1999) procedure. I estimate the rank correlation coefficient (rank 
concordance); I call it C-γ convergence. C-σ and C-γ coefficients are estimated as 
follows:  
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Where CPI is corruption perceptions index, Var (CPI) is the variance of corruption 
perceptions index for a group of heterogeneous countries. Var (RCPI) is the 
corresponding variance of rank of CPI. ti refers to 1996 to 2005 and to is the initial year 
1996. 
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3.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
To understand the trend in corruption I have categorised countries into four 
groups: namely corrupt (0 to less than 3), partly corrupt (3 to less than 5), partly clean (5 
to less than 7), and clean (7 to less than 10). I have used average corruption index (1996-
2005) for this categorisation.  Table 1 shows the categorisation 
 
Table 1 
Categorisation of Countries 
Corrupt Partly Corrupt Partly Clean       Clean 
Argentina Brazil Belgium Australia, Austria, 
Bolivia Colombia France Canada, Chile, 
India Greece Japan Denmark, Finland, 
Indonesia Italy Malaysia Germany, Honk Kong 
Nigeria Mexico Portugal Ireland, Israel, 
Philippines South Korea Spain Netherlands, New Zealand 
Venezuela Thailand Taiwan Norway, Singapore, 
 Turkey  Sweden, Switzerland, 
   United Kingdom, and USA 
 
Out of 40 countries for which data are available from 1996 to 2005, 7 countries 
(on average) are corrupt, 8 countries are partly corrupt, 7 countries are partly clean and 
18 countries are clean. 
The trend in CPI is reported in Table 2 and Table 3. It is evident from Table 2 
and 3 that very few countries have succeeded in moving from one category to another. 
The results do confirm the formation of corrupt clubs that slow down the convergence in 
per capita GDP process. 
 
Table 2 
Trend in Corruption (for Corrupt Countries) 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Argentina CR CR CR CR PCR PCR CR CR CR CR 
Bolivia CR CR CR CR CR CR CR CR CR CR 
India CR CR CR CR CR CR CR CR CR CR 
Indonesia CR CR CR CR CR CR CR CR CR CR 
Nigeria CR CR CR CR CR CR CR CR CR CR 
Philippines CR PCR PCR PCR CR CR CR CR CR CR 
Venezuela CR CR CR CR CR CR CR CR CR CR 
CR = Corrupt; PCR = Partly Corrupt. 
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Table 3 
Trend in Corruption (for Clean Countries) 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Australia C C C C C C C C C C 
Austria C C C C C C C C C C 
Canada C C C C C C C C C C 
Chile PC PC PC PC C C C C C C 
Denmark C C C C C C C C C C 
Finland C C C C C C C C C C 
Germany C C C C C C C C C C 
Hong Kong C C C C C C C C C C 
Ireland C C C C C C PC C C C 
Israel C C C PC PC C C PC PC PC 
Netherlands C C C C C C C C C C 
New Zealand C C C C C C C C C C 
Norway C C C C C C C C C C 
Singapore C C C C C C C C C C 
Sweden C C C C C C C C C C 
Switzerland C C C C C C C C C C 
United Kingdom C C C C C C C C C C 
USA C C C C C C C C C C 
C = Clean; PC = Partly Clean. 
 
Very similar results were found for Partly Corrupt and Partly Clean countries. 
The results are reported in Tables 4 and 5. 
 
Table 4 
Trend in Corruption (for Partly Corrupt Countries) 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Brazil CR PCR PCR PCR PCR PCR PCR PCR PCR PCR 
Colombia CR CR CR CR PCR PCR PCR PCR PCR PCR 
Greece PC PC PCR PCR PCR PCR PCR PCR PCR PCR 
Italy PCR PC PCR PCR PCR PC PC PC PCR PCR 
Mexico PCR CR PCR PCR PCR PCR PCR PCR PCR PCR 
South Korea PC PCR PCR PCR PCR PCR PCR PCR PCR PCR 
Thailand PCR PCR CR PCR PCR PCR PCR PCR PCR PCR 
Turkey PCR PCR PCR PCR PCR PCR PCR PCR PCR PCR 
CR = Corrupt; PCR = Partly Corrupt; PC = Partly Clean. 
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Table 5 
Trend in Corruption (for Partly Clean Countries) 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Belgium PC PC PC PC PC PC C C C C 
France PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC C C 
Japan C PC PC PC PC C C PC PC C 
Malaysia PC PC PC PC PCR PCR PCR PC PCR PC 
Portugal PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC 
Spain PCR PC PC PC PC PC C PC C PC 
Taiwan PCR PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC PC 
PCR = Partly Corrupt; PC = Partly Clean; C = Clean. 
 
When I regress average of CPI on initial value of CPI and a dummy for corrupt 
countries, following results were obtained using ordinary least square method.  
 
Table 6 
Dependent Variables: Average Corruption Index between 1996 and 2005 
Independent Variables  
Constant 0.77 
(1.97)*** 
CPI 1996 0.91 
(18.7)* 
Dummy -0.65 
(-2.03)** 
Adjusted R2 0.95 
D-W Statistic  2.2 
Number of Countries 40 
*** 10 percent level of significance,** 5 percent level of significance,  * 1 percent level of significance, Results 
are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Figures in parenthesis are t-values.  
 
Table 6 shows that countries with high CPI in 1996 have also high average value 
of CPI and vise versa suggesting that corrupt countries in 1996 are corrupt on average 
over the whole period. The negative coefficient of a dummy variable suggests that 
corrupt countries have low value of average CPI, which means more corruption over the 
whole period.  
To further strengthen my analysis, I have calculated C-σ for the full sample and 
for the sample of corrupt and clean countries for the last ten years for which the data are 
available. The sample of corrupt and clean countries slightly deviates from the above 
definition that I have used in Table 1. To have enough observations, I have ranked 
countries as corrupt if the CPI is less than 5 and clean if CPI is greater than 5. The results 
are presented in Table 7.  
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Table 7 
C–σ Coefficient and Standard Deviation (S.D) 
 Full Sample Corrupt Clean 
 S.D. C-σ S.D C-σ S.D. C-σ 
1996 2.58 1.00 1.70 1.00 0.77 1.00 
1997 2.61 1.02 1.62 0.90 0.93 1.50 
1998 2.60 1.01 1.52 0.80 0.93 1.40 
1999 2.58 0.99 1.56 0.80 0.96 1.60 
2000 2.58 0.99 1.65 0.90 0.97 1.60 
2001 2.53 0.95 1.78 1.00 0.78 1.00 
2002 2.58 0.99 1.77 1.10 0.87 1.30 
2003 2.68 1.01 1.89 1.20 0.84 1.20 
2004 2.61 1.00 1.84 1.10 0.89 1.30 
2005 2.56 0.95 1.85 1.10 0.90 1.40 
 
Looking at these standard deviations in Table 7, it is evident that standard deviation 
is not changing drastically suggesting that the relative position of each country over the years 
is same. However, for corrupt countries the standard deviation up until 1998 decreases 
showing C-convergence and after 2000 it appears that they are C-diverging but again in 2004 
and 2005 S.D decreases suggesting C-convergence. One must notice here that the values for 
S.D are very close to each other but this temporary increase in S.D might be due to sudden 
changes in government policies. For clean countries I observe C-convergence between 2000-
2001and 2002-2003. After 2003 it shows C-divergence. Nevertheless, the values are very 
close to each other suggesting that there is no drastic change in their status over time. The C-σ 
coefficient also demonstrates that the relative position of each country in the corruption ladder 
is almost the same with few transitory ups and downs that may be due to government policies 
that affect corruption temporarily or changes in perceptions that might be associated with 
highly visible news items such as corruption in a major weapons procurement contract or the 
removal of a key cabinet official (e.g. public works).  
This issue is further explored by calculating C-γ coefficient for the same set of 
countries. The results are reported in Table 8. 
 
Table 8 
C-γ Coefficient 
 Full Sample Corrupt Clean 
 C-γ C-γ C-γ 
1996 1.000 1.000 1.000 
1997 0.968* 0.843* 0.960* 
1998 0.974* 0.889* 0.956* 
1999 0.965* 0.849* 0.935* 
2000 0.962* 0.888* 0.878* 
2001 0.961* 0.861* 0.863* 
2002 0.948* 0.854* 0.810* 
2003 0.954* 0.848* 0.850* 
2004 0.952* 0.842* 0.860* 
2005 0.952* 0.883* 0.803* 
*1 percent level of significance.  
Naved Ahmad 
 
1008
Table 8 shows that the value of rank correlation (or C-γ) is very high and also 
significant at 1 percent level of significance. The high positive value of rank correlation 
among corrupt countries suggests that they form a corrupt club and do not realise the 
potentiality of high growth rate.  
 
4.  CONCLUSION 
The basic theme of this paper is to demonstrate that persistent corruption is one 
important factor explaining the non-convergence hypothesis across heterogeneous group 
of countries. This paper using methodology of the convergence literature attempts to 
show a C-convergence for a group of corrupt countries that impedes the convergence 
process in per capital GDP. Using Transparency International (TI) corruption perceptions 
index, I calculate C-σ, and C-γ coefficients for both corrupt and less corrupt economies to 
explore C-divergence. I find that corrupt and less corrupt countries are C-diverging in 
corruption rankings, which reduces the speed of convergence process in per capita GDP. 
My results suggest that corrupt countries are indeed C-converging forming a “corrupt 
club”. The study concludes that countries with pervasive corruption cannot exploit the 
benefits of backwardness because of the adverse effects of corruption on social 
capability. This analysis explains why backward nations remain backward. The results 
must be considered with caution, however. This is a preliminary exercise to shed some 
light on the importance of abating corruption in order to realise the potential for high 
economic growth in lagging countries. 
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